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Abstract We present here a novel approach to the analysis of common
knowledge based on category theory. In particular, we model the global epis-
temic state for a given set of agents through a hierarchy of beliefs repre-
sented by a presheaf construction. Then, by employing the properties of a
categorical monad, we prove the existence of a state, obtained in an iterative
fashion, in which all agents acquire common knowledge of some underlying
statement. In order to guarantee the existence of a xed point under certain
suitable conditions, we make use of the properties entailed by Sergeyev's
numeral system called grossone, which allows a ner control on the relevant
structure of the innitely nested epistemic states.
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1. Introduction
Situations of common knowledge are those in which all agents in some context C
knowX, all agents in C know that all agents in C knowX, all agents in C know that
all agents in C know that all agents in C know X, and so on. Such situations are
commonplace in ordinary experience, but due to their implicit innite hierarchy of
nested knowledge-states they pose certain challenges for formally rigorous epistemic
modeling.
Common knowledge was rst explicitly thematized as an auxiliary concept in a
highly inuential game-theoretical analysis of convention (Lewis, 1969). The theo-
retical approach introduced by Lewis was intended to capture the idea that an event
constitutes common knowledge for a set of agents if each of the agents knows that
all the other agents know that all the agents know that all the others know [. . . ] that
the event is the case. In subsequent work, Robert Aumann addressed this question
in greater depth via a set-theoretical characterization of common knowledge such
that common knowledge may be understood in terms of the meet of all the relevant
individual information partitions (Aumann, 1976). An immediate extension of this
characterization is the formalization of Lewis' original intuition as a hierarchical
construction based on Aumann's set-theoretical framework (Geanakoplos, 1994).
From then on, numerous works adopted Aumann's formalism, particularly in Game
Theory (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).
Modal logics in which the modalities are intended to model epistemic operations
and states constitute the core of a very active research program in Epistemic Logic
(Hintikka, 1962). Starting in the 1990s, (Bicchieri, 1993), (Meyer and Hoek, 1995)
https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.24
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and (Bonanno and Battigalli, 1999), among others, presented multi-modal systems
in which common knowledge could be captured. (Fagin et al., 1995) presents a proof
of the equivalence of this modal syntactic approach and the set-theoretical one.
An important contribution consisted in showing that the equivalence1 between
an event being common knowledge and being a public event could be used to de-
ne a xed-point characterization of common knowledge (Barwise, 1988). In turn,
(Heifetz, 1999) demonstrated the equivalence between this latter characterization
and the hierarchical approach, for all nite levels in the iteration.
Category-theoretical formal approaches to common knowledge are lacking in the
literature, despite the seeming naturalness of such a purely structural approach to
the problem. This is unlike the closely related case of notions like that of com-
mon belief, where beliefs are represented by means of probability distributions
(Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987). In the latter case, the notion of coalgebra) allows
to ensure the existence of a xed-point corresponding to an isomorphism between
an object and its image under an endofunctor in a category of probability distri-
butions (Moss and Viglizzo, 2004). One possible reason why this approach has not
been translated to the common knowledge case is that the analogous endofunctor in
Aumann's set-theoretical framework would be quite similar to a powerset functor,
which does not have xed-points.
In this paper we present an alternative categorical treatment in which a xed-
point yields states in which a ground proposition is commonly known. To ensure
this result we need to be able to iterate an endofunctor such that it is, if not
exactly idempotent, capable of being smoothed out or unfolded in a suciently
idempotent-like way. This relatively vague idea may be made precise by way of
the categorical construction called a monad. Making use of a monad construction
will indeed help to resolve the problem indicated above such that analogues to the
powerset functor typically lack xed-points, but this mechanism alone will not yet
be sucient for modeling common knowledge categorically as a xed-point in the
intended manner. Any suitable structure, as already noticed in (Vassilakis, 1992),
will require a more careful treatment that must involve innite iterations, since if
only nite iterations are allowed, there will not in general exist any xed-points
without further additions to the formalism.
A natural framework in which knowledge sequences can be studied without ex-
tra structure is given by the notion of grossone, rst dened by Yaroslav Sergeyev
(Sergeyev, 2017). In Sergeyev's approach the class of natural numbers is N =
{1, 2, 3, . . . ,①− 2,①− 1,①}.
The basic idea is that grossone allows for a ner control on denumerable se-
quences than the classic Cantorian approach (for details, see Sergeyev's presenta-
tion (Sergeyev, 2013)). The grossone framework is based on the Innite Unit Axiom,
which postulates that:
1. Innity: any nite number n is less than the grossone. That is n < ① for every
nite natural number n.
2. Identity: there are several relations linking ① to the identity elements 0 and 1,
namely
0 ·① = ① · 0 = 0 ; ①−① = 0 ; ①
①
= 1 ; ①0 = 1① = 1 ; 0① = 0
1Already pointed out in (Lewis, 1969).
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3. Divisibility: for any nite number n, if 1 ≤ k ≤ n, dene Nn,k = {k, k + n, k +
2n, k + 3n, . . .}. The class {Nn,k}1≤k≤n satises that ∪nk=1Nn,k = N and each
Nn,k has a number of elements indicated by the numeral ①n .
Within this framework, Sergeyev proves (Sergeyev, 2008) the following result:
Theorem: The number of elements in an innite sequence is less or equal to ①.
This result has an interesting consequence. Given a sequence {an}, it is not
enough simply to provide a formula for each an. We must also determine the rst
and last elements in the sequence. Thus, given two sequences
{an} = {5, 10, 15, . . . , 5(①− 1), 5①}






even if an = bn = 5n they are dierent because they have a dierent number of
elements.
The grossone approach has relevant implications in several applied elds (see for
instance (Sergeyev, 2020) for some recent successful developments). Philosophical
and logical aspects of the grossone have been extensively investigated (Lolli, 2015;
Rizza, 2018; Rizza, 2019; Tohme et al., 2020), and our work aims to extend the
reach of applications in these elds of that idea.
Most of our analysis is independent of how we represent N, either in the grossone
or the Cantorian framework, except in the crucial step of dening common knowl-
edge as xed point. For this, we apply the grossone formalism to ensure the exis-
tence of states in which a given proposition is common knowledge.
The advantages of resorting to the grossone formalism are rather straightfor-
ward. In our setting this means that the number of rounds of reasoning needed to
reach common knowledge are undened but nite. If we do not assume that our
agents are capable of performing supertasks2, to model this reasoning process in
the Cantorian setting would make little sense, since reaching common knowledge
is usually the rst step in a decision-making setting. On the other hand, the usual
proofs of existence of xed points of monotonic operators on well-ordered sets in
the Cantorian setting require transnite induction (Echenique, 2005). Its applica-
tion in the case of common knowledge would make sense only for agents able to
carry out the corresponding reasoning processes in nite time. Thus, our grossone
version drops the need of superhuman abilities in our agents and provides a simple
and direct result, formalizing the intuition that at some point all the agents will
reach a state in which some events are common knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic elements of
category theory needed to make this paper self-contained. In Section 3 we dene a
category of knowledge hierarchies. Section 4 presents a monad In in this category.
In Section 5 we show the existence of a xed-point dened in terms of In, yielding
a state in which a proposition is common knowledge.
2A supertask may be dened as an innite sequence of actions or operations carried
out in a nite interval of time (Manchak et al., 2016).
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2. Our Categorical Toolbox
A category consists of a class of objects together with morphisms or arrows
between objects. Given two objects a and b a morphism f between them will be
denoted either f : a → b or a f→ b. A category is subject to axioms of identity
(every object a is equipped with an identity morphism, a
1a→ a), composition (two
morphisms, a
f→ b and b g→ c compose to a unique morphism a g◦f→ c, where
◦ indicates the operation of composition) and associativity (paths of morphisms
compose uniquely, i.e. given three arrows f : a → b, g : b → c and h : c → d,
h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f , given the same morphism from a to d). For more details
on the category-theoretical notions to be used in this paper see (Mac Lane, 2013),
(Johnston, 2002) or (Spivak, 2014)).
A functor F is map between two categories (say A and B), sending objects to
objects and morphisms to morphisms. If for any morphism a→ a′ inA, F (a→ a′) is
mapped to a morphism F (a)→ F (a′) in B, F is said covariant. If instead F (a→ a′)
maps to F (a) ← F (a′), F is contravariant. A contravariant functor can be seen as
a covariant functor F : AOp → B, where AOp is obtained from A by reversing the
direction of all its morphisms.
Given two functors F,G : C → D, a natural transformation τ : F → G is such
that:
 For each object X in category C, there exists a morphism in D, τX : F (X)→
G(X).











meaning that G(f) ◦ τX = τY ◦ F (f).
If a contravariant functor F has as codomain the category of sets, i.e. F : AOp →
Set, F is called a presheaf. Given a xed category A, the category in which the
objects are all the preasheaves over A while the morphisms are the natural trans-
formations between preasheaves is called a topos.
The paradigmatic example of a topos is Set itself, hinting at the fact that rich
structures can be constructed inside any topos. For instance, each topos has an
object Ω called subobject classier, which in the case of Set is the set {0, 1} which
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where !A : A→ 1 indicates the unique morphism from A to the terminal object
1,3 True picks up the largest element in Ω, namely 1, and f is the function that
assigns 1 to the fact that A is indeed a subset of B.
In a general topos, we replace ⊆ with a monomorphism, which is a concept
that abstracts away the notion of a one-to-one or injective function. In the case
of a category of presheaves, we say that given F,G : AOp → Set, F → G is a
monomorphism if F (a) ⊆ G(a) for each object a in A. In turn 1 is such that 1(a)
has a single element for each a in A. The subobject classier Ω consists of all the
sieves on each object a in A.4
In this paper we will build a complete partial order where the elements are
objects in a topos and the order obtain from morphisms among them.
A concept that will be relevant for our analysis is that of a monad which consists
of:
 An endofunctor (a functor from a category to itself) T : C→ C.
 Two natural transformations:
• unit map: η : idC → T (where idC is the identity in C).
• multiplication map: µ : T 2 → T (where T 2 is the functor obtained composing
T with itself.



























A salient example of a monad is, in Set the powerset endofunctor, that yields
for every set X the class of its subsets. For any given set X the multiplication
map sends every subset X2 of a subset X1 of X to X1. Another example is the list
3In Set the terminal object consists of a singleton {∗} since there exists a single function
from any set to it.
4A sieve S on a in A is the class of all the morphisms f : a′ → a in the category, such
that, if there exists a morphism g : a′′ → a′ in A, f ◦ g : a′′ → a belongs also to S.
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endofunctor on Set, that given anyX builds a list of its elements. The corresponding
multiplication map for a set X collapses a list of lists of X's elements to a plain list
of the elements of X.
3. A Category of Knowledge Hierarchies
Given a set A of agents, we dene a category Aseq such that
 Given N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 1O − 2, 1O − 1, 1O}, we dene Obj(Aseq) as the class of
sequences of elements of A of length less than ①. Each object ā over A, can be
understood as a word in the alphabet on A.5
 Each morphism ā
f−→ (x̄, ā) between two objects ā and (x̄, ā) is the right inclusion
of a sequence ā into a sequence with prex x̄ ∈ Obj(Aseq) and sux ā.
A contravariant functor KH : Aopseq −→ Set assigns a sequence ā in Aseq to a
knowledge hierarchy.
Given ā = (a1, a2, . . . an) we have that:
KH[ā] = {γ : γ is a state where a1 knows that a2 . . . knows that an knows P ∈ Λ}
where Λ is a class of objective facts of the world. Each KH[ā] is a section of KH
at ā.
Given a morphism ā
f−→ (x̄, ā) where x̄ = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) and ā = (a1, a2, . . . , an),










A morphism like KH[f ], a restriction along f , has a clear interpretation: for
each γ ∈ KH[x̄, ā] it assigns a γ′ ∈ KH[ā] such that γ′ corresponds to the
a1 knows that a2 . . . knows that an knows γ fragment of the hierarchy x1 knows
that x2 knows that xm knows a1 knows that a2 . . . knows that an knows γ.
Figure 1 depicts a contravariant functor on 2, 1 and empty sequences on A =
{a, b}.
Consider then the category of contravariant functors from Aseq to Set, KH:
 Each KH ∈ Obj(KH) is a contravariant functor KH : Aopseq −→ Set with the
properties described above.
 Given two objects KH,KH ′ of KH, a morphism KH τ−→ KH ′ is a natural
transformation. That is, given a morphism ā
f−→ (x̄, ā) in Aseq, the following
5This recasts in the grossone framework the Computer Science concept of streams. See
(Manes, and Arbib, 1986,pp. 276), (Barwise and Moss, 1996, pp. 34) or (Milewski, 2017,
pp. 234).
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With this specication, KH is a category of presheaves on Set and thus a topos.
In this topos, as briey discussed in Section 2, KH
τ−→ KH ′ is a monomorphism
if KH[ā] ⊆ KH ′[ā] for each ā in Aseq. In turn, the terminal object 1 is such that
1[ā] includes a single state of knowledge for each ā.
The subobject classier Ω is dened as follows. For each ā = (a1, . . . , an), Ω[ā]
includes all the sieves on ā. Any such a sieve S includes a class of morphisms ā′ → ā,
where ā′ is a subsequence of (a1, . . . , an) as well as all the morphisms that can be
composed with morphisms already in S in such a way that the composition has
codomain a. A trivial result is the following:
Proposition 1 If given a monomorphism KH












then, for every â in Aseq of length 1O, True selects in Ω[â] the sieve of all
morphisms ā
f−→ (x̄, ā) for every subsequences ā and (x̄, ā) in the sequence â. This
sieve corresponds to a single state γ 1O.
Proof: It follows from the denition of the subobject classier and the True natural
transformation. □
4. The Unfolding Monad
We dene an endofunctor In : KH → KH such that In(KH) = KH ′ specied
as follows. Given ā in Aseq and an element γ ∈ KH[ā], In assigns γ′ ∈ KH ′[ā],
with
γ′ = ⟨γ−1, γ−2, . . . , γ−n⟩
where:
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KH[fn−1]←−−−−−− . . .KH[ā−1]
KH[f1]←−−−−− KH[ā]
 For each i = 1, . . . , n− 1, each γ−(i+1) ∈ KH[fi+1](KH(ā−i)).
Now consider the following natural transformations:
 The unit map η : idKH → In, such that for given ā, ηā[γ] = γ′ for γ ∈ KH[ā]
and γ′ ∈ In(KH)[ā].
 The multiplication map µ : In ◦ In→ In, such that given ā, if we have:
• γ ∈ KH[ā],
• ⟨γ−1, γ−2, . . . , γ−n⟩ ∈ In(KH)[ā] and
• ⟨⟨γ−2, γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, ⟨γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, . . . , ⟨γ−n⟩⟩ ∈ In(In)(KH)[ā].
Then µā[⟨⟨γ−2, γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, ⟨γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, . . . , ⟨γ−n⟩⟩] = ⟨γ−1, γ−2, . . . , γ−n⟩
We have that:
Proposition 2 In, with η and µ constitutes a monad.




























Consider the rst diagram above (the second one is analogous). Take ⟨γ−1, γ−2,
. . . , γ−n⟩ ∈ In(KH)[ā] and apply rst the identity of In, which yields exactly the
same element and then η[ā], which gives ⟨⟨γ−2, γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, ⟨γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, . . . ,
⟨γ−n⟩⟩ ∈ In(In)(KH)[ā]. If we apply now µ[ā] on this element we obtain
⟨γ−1, γ−2, . . . , γ−n⟩ ∈ In(KH)[ā], indicating that the diagram commutes.
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With respect to the third diagram consider the following element in
In(In(In))(KH)[ā]:
⟨⟨⟨γ−3, γ−4, . . . , γ−n⟩,
⟨γ−4, . . . , γ−n⟩, . . . , ⟨γ−n⟩⟩, ⟨⟨γ−4, . . . , γ−n⟩, . . . , ⟨γ−n⟩⟩, . . . , ⟨⟨γ−n⟩⟩⟩
if we apply µā ◦ idIn(KH)[a] (or idIn(KH)[a] ◦ µā) we obtain
⟨⟨γ−2, γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, ⟨γ−3, . . . , γ−n⟩, . . . , ⟨γ−n⟩⟩ ∈ In(In)(KH)[ā]
Then, the application of µ yields ⟨γ−1, γ−2, . . . , γ−n⟩ ∈ In(KH)[ā], showing that
the diagram commutes. □
The monad (In, η, µ) yields, for every presheaf KH in KH the class of unfold-
ings of its elements. In other words, for any γ ∈ KH[ā] it gives the ber over γ
corresponding to the knowledge hierarchy below it. Notice that this hierarchy is
unique, i.e. In−1(γ) is a singleton. By the same token, µ yields also a single element
in In(In)(KH)[ā], since it is completely dened by the knowledge (and the order)
of the agents in ā.
Figure 2 illustrates how the monad acts on a presheaf KH at 3, 2, 1 and ground-





























< {γba, γa, p} >
< p >
< {γba, p} >
p
Fig. 2. Representation of In on A = {a, b}
5. Common Knowledge
Given the monad (In, η, µ), anyKH inKH is such that ηā : KH[ā]→ In(KH)[ā]
yields ηā[γ] = ⟨γ−1, . . . , γ−n⟩.
Any γ̂ such that ηā[γ̂] = γ̂ is a xed point. This would mean that KH[ā] ⊆
In(KH)[ā]. But this is not possible in particular for any ā ∈ An with n < ① since
the sequence ā−1, . . . , ā−n has length n−1 (if we discard the nal empty sequence).
This means that for γ̂ ∈ KH[â] to be a xed point it is necessary to ask for the
satisfaction of certain conditions. Consider the following two:
 Uniformity: â = (. . . ,a,a, . . . ,a) where a ∈ A|A| such that it does not include
repeated agents.
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 Exchangeability: a ≡ a′ where a = (a1, . . . , a|A|) and a′ = (ap(1), ap(2), . . . , ap(|A|)),
where p : {1, . . . , |A|} → {1, . . . , |A|} is a bijection. This means that two se-
quences of all the agents are the same, modulo permutations of their names.
Notice that, according to the denition of Aseq, a uniform and exchangeable
sequence â will have length less than 1O. We can denote it â①.
Proposition 3 If â① satises uniformity and exchangeability, any γ̂ such that
ηâ①
[γ̂] = γ̂ represents a state in which a given P ∈ Λ is common knowledge
Proof: Since γ̂ is a xed point of ηâ①
, it means that there exists a P ∈ Λ such
that the γ̂ is identical to the ber over γ̂, which includes the following states of
knowledge:
 a1 knows P ,
 . . .,
(*) a know P ,
 . . .,
(**) a know that a know P ,
 . . .,
(***) a know that a know that a know P ,
 . . .
where the starred statements can be translated as (∗) everybody knows P ,
(∗∗) everybody knows that everybody knows P , (∗ ∗ ∗) everybody knows that
everybody knows that everybody knows P , etc. That is, P is common knowledge.
□
The existence of such γ̂ is predicated on two properties:
Proposition 4 There exists an object â of Aseq satisfying uniformity and exchange-
ability.
Proof: Trivial. By denition, Obj(Aseq) includes any possible sequence of agents of
length < ①, in particular â①. □
The remaining property is the existence of a xed point of ηâ①
. We will use
here the fact that KH is a topos. As shown in (Johnston, 2002), internal categories
can be dened inside a topos.6 We will dene such internal category KP , which can
be trivially described as a partially ordered set. The rst step in this construction
requires considering a sequence in Aseq, denoted â↓①:
an → (an−1 an)→ (an−2 an−1 an)→ a→ . . .→ (a a)→ . . .→ â①
such that â① satises uniformity and exchangeability. Given a P ∈ Λ we con-
sider the class of presheaves KH = {KH ∈ KH : KH[ā] ̸= ∅, for every ā ∈
â↓
①
with KH[∅] = {P}}. This class is non-empty in KH, since always exists a KH
6An important proviso is that there does not exist a one-to-one function between KH
and the internal category KP . The cardinality of the objects in the latter is strictly less
than that of KH, since we have assumed that the length of â① is strictly less than ①.
A Categorical Characterization of a ①-Iteratively Dened State 339
such that each section is non-empty.
We can now dene a category KP , in which its set of objects is
K0P = {KH[∅],KH[an],KH[an−1an], . . . ,KH[a],KH[ana], . . . ,KH[aa],
. . .KH[â①], for each KH ∈ KH}. The data of KP includes a set K
1
P of mor-
phisms among the objects of K0P , inherited from the category KH.
For each morphism f : a→ x̄a, we deneKH[a] ⪯ KH[x̄a] for everyKH ∈ KH.
This means that any element in KH[a] is the tail in the unfolding of an element in
KH[x̄a].
With this order relation KP becomes a complete partially ordered set ( poset), i.e.
every subset of KP as a least upper bound. To see this, consider any set
{KH1[ā1], . . . ,KHα[āα]} in K0P , for α < ①. Take the least upper bound of {ā1, . . . ,
āα}, an element in the sequence â↓①, denoted ā.
7 Then take ∪αj=1KHj [ā] ̸= ∅. There
always exist a presheaf KH ∈ KH that satises the condition of having non-empty
sections at all the elements in the sequence â↓ and such thatKH[ā] = ∪αj=1KHj [ā] ∈
KP . It follows that KHj [āj ] ⪯ KH[ā], for each j = 1, . . . , α < ①.
Notice that KH is such that KH
τ−→ KH is a monomorphism for every KH
in KH. And thus, according to Proposition 1 at â① the identity KH
1KH−−−→ KH (a
trivial monomorphism) corresponds to a single state γ̂①.
We also have that KH[aα] ⪯ KH[â①] for every KH[aα] ∈ K
0
P . Then, the
restriction of the monad endofunctor on KP , In : KP → KP must satisfy that
In(KH)[â①] ⪯ KH[â①]. But this means that for each γ̂ ∈ KH[â①] its unfolding
must be its own tail. But this is only possible if ηâ①
[γ̂①] = γ̂①.
Since for each P ∈ Λ a corresponding complete internal poset KP can be dened,
we have proven the following claim:
Proposition 5 There exists a presheafKH in KH and a state γ̂① ∈ In(KH)[â 1O] =
KH[â 1O] such that in γ̂①, P ∈ Λ ∩KH[∅] is common knowledge.

























= {. . . , γ̂, . . . }
Fig. 3. Fixed point of ηâ①
7â↓
①
is, by denition, a linear order, and thus trivially a complete poset.
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6. Conclusions and Further Work
The category KH equipped with the monad (In, η, µ) provides a categorical
framework for treating the problem of common knowledge from the perspective
of xed-points of an endofunctor dened on presheaves over the category of hier-
archies of a xed set of agents. Our main result is that under the conditions of
uniformity and exchangeability, a xed point may be determined such that the as-
sociated proposition necessarily takes the form of common knowledge among the
agents in the model. Crucial to the construction has been the use of the grossone
notation in order to regulate the innite hierarchical sequences of agents at issue.
In further research, we hope to extend the categorical framework for common
knowledge established here in the direction of a formal theory of collective agency
in games.
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